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Abstract: By virtue of Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë’s enactive sensorimotor contingency
theory, and its central tenets perception is constituted by mastery of occurrent sensorimotor
contingencies used for thought and actionguidance the theory suggests the resolution of the
explanatory gap problem and provides arguments to dismantle representationalist research
programs. I address two objections to O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory. The
first is that synaesthetic visual colorperception creates the problem of onetomany ratios of
qualitative experience. One environmental input, for a synesthete creates multiple sensory
experiences, and this threatens the lawlike nature of sensorimotor contingencies which
constitute perception along with a perceiver’s knowledge of them. The second problem I address
for a sensorimotor contingency theory is discussed by Daniel Hutto, and he argues that the theory
implies propositional knowledge by requiring that skills or knowledge create perceptual
experience along with sensorimotor contingency laws. Consequently, this would render
perceptual consciousness as statebased, and falling back onto mental representation. I suggest
that the occurrent nature of perception for a sensorimotor contingency theory shows that
synaesthesia, or any phenomenal experience, does not have to be constituted by isomorphic
inputoutput mappings for perceptual consciousness. In answering the second objection, I
suggest that the best way to understand a sensorimotor contingency theory is pragmatically. For
example, the sensorimotor contingency theory and enactivism provided an answer to some of the
problems the paradigm of mental representation faced when trying to explain consciousness.
Whereas Hutto’s arguments are a critique of enactivism, I suggest that the value of a
sensorimotor contingency theory is best seen in the context of the tradition, which I illustrate
with Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s theses concerning embodied cognition and mindfulness
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traditions. In light of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s work, the value of a sensorimotor
contingency theory can be highlighted, which I suggest, can guide future research about the
mind, and guide research in the cognitive sciences to a more unified approach to understanding
phenomenal and cognitive consciousness. I offer that embodied cognition highlights the context
of a sensorimotor contingency theory and shows its epistemological and pragmatic value for
scientific research.
Keywords: sensorimotor contingencies, visual perception, consciousness, synaesthesia, radical
enactivism, enactive and embodied cognition, mindfulness/meditation, phenomenology,
cognition
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I. Introduction to the Sensorimotor Contingency Theory: An ExplanatoryGap Solution,
and a RepresentationalistParadigm Critique
Alva Noë and Kevin O’Regan propose a theory of perceptual and visual consciousness in
their paper, “A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness,” in which the
qualitative character of perceptual experience is constituted by a perceiver’s mastery of
sensorimotor contingencies. One’s mastery of sensorimotor contingencies is used for rational
planning, actionguidance, and thought.1 Sensorimotor contingencies are the laws that govern
perception and sensory experience. For example, when perceivers scan the visual field, the
changes in the optical array causes changes in the retina. These changes, in light of perceivers’
bodily movement, are sensorimotor contingencies.
O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory is proposed as a solution to the
problems that representational theories of visual consciousness are not able to adequately address
2

Representational theories of visual consciousness take perceptual and visual consciousness to

be formed on the basis of inner mental representations of visual scenes, and attempt to locate a
neural correlate of consciousness.3 On O’Regan and Noë’s account, a perceiver’s capacity to
interact with the environment is instantiated by a perceiver’s knowledge of lawlike sensorimotor
contingencies in which the environment couples with one’s perception.4 The sensorimotor
contingency theory is an enactive take on visual consciousness and perception, in which enactive
means that the perceiver explores the environment, and this activity constitutes perception.5
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The motive behind enactivist theories about perception and consciousness is that they
stand to present an alternative to the approach of a representational theory of the mind.6 Thus
O’Regan and Noë argue that perceptual experience does not involve the use of internal mental
representations, but rather involves the use of capacities on the part of the perceiver, to interact
with the environment.7 The way in which O’Regan and Noë discount the idea that
representations are able to account for experience is through the explanation that regardless of
the kind of representations that we have in the mind, they cannot account for the temporality,
spatiality, and conceptuality of phenomenological experience.8 Instead, O’Regan and Noë offer
that implicit and innate abilities that individuals have to experience couplings between
sensorimotor contingencies and the environment are what create unified perceptual experiences.9
O’Regan and Noë state that their sensorimotor contingency theory solves the explanatory
gap for consciousness by arguing that sensory experience is active, and something we do, and so
explains the nature of perceptual consciousness.10 The explanatory gap is best illustrated by
Joseph Levine in “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” but is also discussed as the
“hard problem” of consciousness by David Chalmers, and stands as the idea that those working
in the sciences and philosophies of the mind and consciousness have not yet agreed upon one
comprehensive, unified, theory of why cognition includes “feelingstates.”11 The explanatory gap
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is, as Joseph Levine states, the problem that physicalism (or the physical sciences) have in
describing mental terms and experiences.12
There is a problem of matching explanations within scientific theories of the mind to
conceptions of the mental that accept Cartesian dualism, or even emergentism and
supervenience, and this causes a gap in unified theoretical explanations about consciousness.13
Emergentism and supervenience theories hold that mental properties arise out of physical events,
like neural interactions. The explanatory gap concerns conflicts between explanations for the
theoretical underpinnings of consciousness among scientific paradigms. The “hard problem” of
consciousness is the same idea, with a different name, which is the problem that the felt nature of
conscious experience cannot yet be completely described in scientific terms, or by scientific
theories about the mind.14
O’Regan and Noë’s theory is posed in order to solve the problem of the explanatory gap
for consciousness by stating that visual consciousness arises because vision is a mode of
exploration that depends on the perceiver’s knowledge and mastery of lawlike sensorimotor
contingencies.15 One’s knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies solves the problem of the
explanatory gap according to O’Regan and Noë because perceptual consciousness is constituted
by a kind of “doing.”16 Thus, the felt nature of experience is instantiated by a way of acting, and
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not by a state, while explanatory gap rests on the idea that the qualia of conscious experience are
mental states that cannot be described in physicalist terms as of now.[17] 18 ]
On a more metaphysical reading, O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory
holds that the sensory quality of experience determines perceptual consciousness because of an
individual's ability to enact, spatiotemporally, perceptual consciousness. In that way, the
phenomenal nature of consciousness is not a state, because it is instead determined by
spatiotemporally continuous kinds of events, which supervene on both the perceiver’s the ability
to act, and on one’s possession of innate capacities for things like bodily movement, guidance,
and rational thought.[19] [20] Hence, O’Regan and Noë claim there is no explanatory gap according
to their theory. This is supported by the notion that one’s knowledge of sensorimotor
contingencies constitutes perceptual experience, and the qualitative character of perceptual
experience neither of which can be described in terms of discrete occurrences.21 Since the notion
of the explanatory gap generally asserts that there is a lack of continuity in explanation between
dualist, or internalist theories of the mind, and physicalist, and scientific theories about the mind,
an enactive sensorimotor contingency theory, according to the claims of its proponents, falls into
neither of these paradigms. This is how enactivism avoids the explanatory gap problem.
Not only is the problem of explanatory gap able to be solved according to O’Regan and
Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory, the theory also explains that representations of the
outside world, used functionally or computationally, do not and cannot describe the perceptual
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nature, or the “whatit’slike” of visual consciousness.22 Part of that is because seeing happens as
it actively attends to the world, and so cannot be located solely within the brain.23 This claim has
been introduced above through the argument that perceptual consciousness is not statebased, but
rather, for O’Regan and Noë, is temporally extended.24 They offer that the visual system stores
information (which can be representations) that are able to influence behavior and mental states
either directly or indirectly.25 O’Regan and Noë state that stored information that can be
instantiated as representations, might account for changes in behavior, but they argue that we are
not always consciously aware of these changes, nor do these representations allow for visual
perception.26
I.1 Empirical Work on Change Blindness
In order to support the sensorimotor contingency theory and its scope of (1) solving the
explanatory gap, and (2) ridding science of the need to find a neural correlate of consciousness,
or the need for positing inner mental representations as descriptive in some way of perception,
O’Regan and Noë cite empirical data. The empirical data that supports this theory include:
change blindness, sensory substitution, and invertedgoggle experiments, and it concerns the
nature of sensory modalities.27 One of the empirical studies discussed in further detail here
includes change blindness, although O’Regan and Noë offer a wealth of empirical data that lends
support to their theory.
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In changeblindness experiments, subjects are shown flickering images of the same visual
scene that cyclically repeat.28 In the series of these observed images, a large object might
drastically change place, or an object might disappear completely from the scene.29 The flicker in
these cases, is what causes the lowlevel mechanisms in the visual system that would normally
detect the change, i.e., the transient signal, immediately to either miss the change all together, or
to only notice it after a considerable lapse of time.30 Because these relatively largescale changes
go undetected by observers (caused in part by the quick flickering of the images) O’Regan and
Noë hold that this study demonstrates that what is seen consciously does not always coincide
with the visual scene.31
O’Regan and Noë use change blindness theories to provide further reasoning for the
claim that perceptual consciousness does not happen on the basis of the formation of inner
mental representations. In other words, perceptual consciousness for O’Regan and Noë cannot be
explained only via inner mental representations. They argue that change blindness and other
empirical work demonstrates that we do not need to depend upon explanations for perceptual
consciousness that require unified and continuous inner mental representations because seeing is
an activity that requires “doing something of a visual nature with information available to the
brain.”32 In this way, perception is active, and happens outside the brain, as the agent or perceiver
engages with the environment, and is attuned to sensorimotor laws governing visual exploration.
O’Regan and Noë argue that we can have continuous and unified experience, without having
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continuous and unified representations, and they use experiments of change blindness to support
this idea.33
1.2 Change Blindness
O’Regan and Noë further use the change blindness studies to support the idea that we do
not necessarily “see” everything in a visual scene, but have the impression that we do because
the world functions as an “outside memory.”34 The world as an “outside memory” consists in the
idea that the visual scene is available for probing just as a memory is available for inquiring into
and reflecting upon.35 This metaphor entails that while a memory may not be consciously present
in the mind, one can incite a memory into conscious thought atwill, and so going, all aspects of
a given visual scene are not consciously attended to in every temporally continuous moment, 36
but should one focus on different objects of a scene, one can verify that those objects are
veridically being understood or percepted.37
As concerns the change blindness studies, O’Regan and Noë argue that because visual
consciousness does not require internal representations, only what is currently being attended to
by the visual apparatus is then seen.38 This is how one could miss the change of an object during
the flicker of the visual scene shown to them. The flicker, they explain, floods, or overtakes the
local transient signal caused by the change, that the visual system would normally detect. The
information from the flicker distracts the visual system from detecting the usual transient signals
that would allow one to be aware of such a change as an object disappearing from a scene, or
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some part of the scene being relatively drastically altered.39 Thus, empirical work from change
blindness experiments support the idea that while visual consciousness entails the subjective
quality of the appearance of richness of the entire visual scene, visual consciousness is only
aware of what it actively attends to. This constitutes the idea of the world as an outside memory,
and describes why we can miss largescale changes in a visual scene, but still perceive the
environment as richly detailed.40
II. Objections to a Sensorimotor Contingency Theory
There are problems concerning the feasibility of an enactive sensorimotor theory that
stand to make the theory noncredible. Two are addressed here: one is an empirical objection,
and the other conceptual. The empirical objection addressed here to an enactive sensorimotor
contingency theory includes the phenomenon of synaesthesia. The conceptual objection to an
enactivist’s sensorimotor contingency theory illustrated here can be seen through the analysis of
Daniel D. Hutto from his article, “Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism,” and
centers around problems with the use of knowledge that perceivers have of sensorimotor
contingencies, and a problem with the nomological nature of sensorimotor contingencies.
II.1 An Empirical Objection to an Enactive Sensorimotor Contingency Theory: the
Problem of Synaesthesia
An empirical problem that requires further critical exposition from an enactive
sensorimotorcontingency theory is the phenomenon of perceptual synaesthetic experience.
Color synaesthesia is looked at in the literature, but there are other kinds as well, and it is the
neurological condition that occurs when vivid sensations of color are experienced during the
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reading or hearing of words in subjects who possess this condition.41 Instead of experiencing
typical qualitative states in response to visual or auditorystimulus inputs, synesthetes experience
for example the hearing of a word, which simultaneously pairs with a color sensation.
In work by Susan Hurley and Alva Noë on neural plasticity, they address evidence, and
proposals for a sensorimotor account of consciousness, which they call in their article, “Neural
Plasticity and Consciousness,” the dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. The dynamic sensorimotor
hypothesis can be thought of here as a specification in like manner to O’Regan and Noë’s “A
sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.” For Hurley and Noë, the dynamic
sensorimotor hypothesis demonstrates on the basis of supporting empirical evidence that changes
in qualitative experiences of consciousness depend not just on neural activity related to
corresponding brain regions in which those sensations are typically located, but also on
embodied activity. Embodied activity for Hurley and Noë is instantiated by patterns of
sensorimotor contingencies as they depend on environmental stimuli.42 Thus, they hold that
conscious visual perception also depends upon dynamic patterns of sensorimotor contingencies.43
Hurley and Noë offer that both changes in qualitative expression, which are qualitative
experiences that reflect their sensory inputs, and perceptual adaptation depend on dynamic,
modalityspecific patterns of sensorimotor contingency, which perceivers have knowledge of and
actively exploit as a skillful activity in order to explore and negotiate with their environments.44
According to Hurley and Noë in the case of synaesthesia, the visual cortex defers to
visual qualitative experience, despite having received input from a new sensory source. In this
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way, the case of the neurological condition of synaesthesia involves intermodal cortical
dominance.45 Hurley and Noë illustrate empirical evidence that supports the automatic, and
completely perceptual nature of synaesthetic color experience.46 For example, they explain a
study done by Ramachandran and Hubbard in 2011, in which a different kind of Ishihara test was
performed (normally used to test for redgreen color blindness) on individuals who saw numerals
synaesthetically. The numbers two and five were presented as mirror images of each other, and
the numerals were arranged so that the fives made a pattern. Normal colorperceivers could not
distinguish the pattern, while the synaesthetes were able to do so, since they saw the two’s and
fives in different colors; thus, the synaesthetes were able to discern the pattern in the numbers.47
This illustration of synaesthetic color perception is important to Hurley and Noë’s
dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis because it presents a direct challenge in which there is a
disconnect between the lawlike sensorimotor contingencies that apply crossmodally during the
process of perceiverengaged visual experience, and perception. This disconnect occurs because
in this case, “qualia varies independently of sensorimotor facts.”48 That is, the qualitative inputs
are not in a onetoone relation with the sensorimotor contingency laws, but instead the relation
between the qualitative input to the sensorimotor contingency laws is onetomany. According to
Jeffrey Gray in “How are Qualia Coupled to Functions?” in this way, there are two distinct, and
entirely separate sensory experiences for one peripheral input. Thus, the corresponding neural
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activity typically paired with the peripheral inputs in synaesthetic color experience does not
functionally correspond to that sensory experience.49
This creates a problem for the coupling between qualitative states and brainbehavior, as
Gray describes Hurley and Noë’s hypothesis, or the coupling between the sensorimotor
dependencies of experience on qualitative perceptual experience.50 Noë and Hurley respond to
the challenge that synaesthesia presents to the idea that qualitative experience is gained
perceptually via the coupling of sensorimotor contingencies by stating that further empirical
work needs to be done in order to know whether or not a kind of sensorimotor approach can be
applied (as an integrated account) to perceptual consciousness.51 For this reason, it is clear that
Hurley and Noë’s dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis faces difficulty for its plausibility when met
with the phenomenon of synaesthesia.
Jeffrey Gray takes Hurley and Noë’s dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis to be interpreted
as functionalism in the case of cortical deference, which occurs when qualitative experience is
influenced by sensorimotorcontingent enacted behavior.52 Hurley and Noë give an example of
cortical deference as the following: during blindpersons reading of Braille, their visual cortex is
active, although they are experiencing tactile sensory inputs.53 There have also been multiple
studies done which show that when blind persons receive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS), as opposed to subjects with typical vision whose visual, but not tactile perceptions are
distorted, blind persons’ tactile perceptions are distorted.54 In the case of Braille readers, the
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tactile cortex  normally activated in individuals with typical eyesight during haptic experience 
defers to activation of the visual cortex because of the sensory inputs received.55 In this way,
cortical deference demonstrates relevance of sensory inputs as able to effect qualitative
character.
II.2 Implications for Synaesthesia and Enactive Sensorimotor Theories
The general conclusion of both O’Regan and Noë’s work on the sensorimotor
contingency theory, and Hurley and Noë’s work on the dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis is that
neural activity and functional representations are not sufficient on their own in determining the
character of qualitative experience. If we take Gray’s functionalist construction of the dynamic
sensorimotor hypothesis to apply adequately to sensorimotor theories, then the problem that
synaesthesia presents for the application of sensorimotor theories to conscious perception
remains, and threatens the nomological nature of sensorimotor contingencies as they are to
constitute visual perception. Gray, as well as Hurley and Noë suggest that if their dynamic
sensorimotor hypothesis is a functionalist theory, any phenomenon in which there is two
qualitative percepts for one functional input, may not hold true to functionalism. The
sensorimotor contingency theory, consequently would appear not to functionally apply across all
phenomena given the case of synaesthesia.
To the extent that O’Regan and Noë suggest that the mapping of functions to qualia can
be nonisomorphic, synaesthesia then would present no detrimental problem for a sensorimotor
contingency theory.56 O’Regan and Noë are critiquing representationalist views about the mind,
however it can be extrapolated that if there is no onetoone or isomorphic relationship between
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the neural substrate and qualitative states, then this affects the sensorimotor contingency theory’s
applicability to the phenomenon of synaesthesia. It does so by allowing the possibility that the
laws of sensorimotor contingency can include the ontological relationship in which one
functional input produces many qualitative states, or vice versa. Since this is not the way that
most normal perception occurs, that is, except in the case of synaesthesia, this idea is on shaky
ground from a representationalists’ perspective. Consequently, it would be doubtful that the
sensorimotor contingency theory could account for perceptual experience.
There is one major issue with this objection. I suggest that this form of objection harkens
back to a dispositional, internal, and statebased ideas about conscious experience. If we take the
temporalextendedness of sensorimotor laws seriously, there is no reason why they cannot
substantiate a nonisomorphicbased phenomenality. David Silverman notes in “Sensorimotor
enactivism and temporal experience” that content itself must be temporally extended in order to
couple with a temporally extended vehicle.57 If content, as Silverman says, “temporally tracks a
temporally extended vehicle,”58 and this accounts for occurrent perception, then perception lacks
statebased access to experience, and synaesthesia would be a phenomenon that cannot described
functionally according to a sensorimotor contingency thesis, but may not have to be. That is, a
sensorimotor contingency theory’s predictive power does not lie in accounting for a kind of
inputoutput matching to qualitative states, but rather in the notion that experience is always
temporally extended.59
If O’Regan and Noë are correct, then the phenomenon of synaesthesia ought to be able to
be described empirically and under the laws of sensorimotor contingency, like any other
57
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perceptual phenomenon. It would be a mistake to the objection about synaesthesia for the
sensorimotor contingency theory as detrimental to an enactivist position, given O’Regan and
Noë’s argument which puts forward that experience consists of temporally extended knowledge
of sensorimotor contingencies,60 and Silverman’s analysis. This brings us to the conceptual
objection to O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory, for which, the embodied
nature of cognition needs to be explained. This may be the best way to understand the motives
behind an enactive and sensorimotor contingency theory, and thus illustrate the theory’s
epistemological implications for both the nature of consciousness and the empirical and
cognitive sciences.
II.3 PropositionalKnowledge and Nomological Objections to a Sensorimotor Contingency
Theory
Daniel Hutto, in his article, “Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism,”
brings up the argument that O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory cannot not
depend upon skillful, practical knowledge.61 Hutto iterates this claim by is to drawing the
distinction between propositional knowledge and knowledge that is skillful, technical, or
practical.62 Hutto argues that knowhow is not described in many of O’Regan and Noë’s central
claims of the sensorimotor contingency theory.63 Hutto contests O’Regan and Noë’s use of the
terms, “knowledge that” when referring to the sensorimotor contingency theory because he
argues that this usage relegates the claims they are making to being propositionalknowledge
claims, and not practicalknowledge claims, since knowledge “that” something is the case is a
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kind of statement that entails justified true belief, and not the explication of a technique or skill.64
Hutto states that instead, O’Regan and Noë’s unacknowledged use of propositional knowledge
causes their theory to fall back onto endorsing inner mental representations, and thus Hutto
argues that O’Regan and Noë lose their central argument.
For Hutto then, O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory cannot be
constituted by knowledge or skillful mastery.65 Hutto states that O’Regan and Noë’s claim that
the qualitative nature of perceptual consciousness can be accounted for by the conceptualization
of visual consciousness as being constituted by the perceiver’s capacities to interact with the
environment66 cannot consist of knowledge, practical, or propositional because 1) it would fall
back onto a representationalist paradigm67 and 2) because practical knowledge of perception
cannot be taught, in that perception is not a learned skill.68
Hutto also takes issue with the idea that sensorimotor contingencies are lawlike,or
nomological in nature.69 He states that once laws are posited as entities, they need to be
prescriptive and normative, and those that involve sensorimotor contingencies are neither of the
two.70 He argues this is the case because the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies needs to
account for what ineffectual accomplishment of executing sensorimotor coupling might entail.71
Hutto holds that sensorimotor contingencies are not laws because there is no counteraccount of
them. In other words, Hutto argues that O’Regan and Noë’s proposed sensorimotor contingency
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laws are not normative since they provide no account for what perception would be if the rules
failed.72 Rather, Hutto states that “bodily behavior” is not determined by laws, but that the
character of perceptual experience can be determined by the response of the different sensory
modalities to specific objects.73 Hutto also argues that the only way for perceptual experience to
occur would be to subtract the “knowledge of” something from a sensorimotor contingency
theory, and instead suffice with the more minimal claim that perceptual experience is determined
by the character of the reaction of different sensory modalities to external objects.74
I offer that this is a highly semantic interpretation of the sensorimotor contingency
theory, and disregards the scientific and metaphysical account that O’Regan and Noë are
offering, which is that sensorimotor laws are the physical changes that occur when a perceiver,
whose knowledge more or less, constitutes innate abilities to perceive, interacts with the
environment. The sensorimotor laws are just the way an individual interacts with the
environment, given what her perceptual modalities are capable of. Additionally, O’Regan and
Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory is not incompatible with Hutto’s suggestion about
contentless interaction. The sensorimotor laws on O’Regan and Noë’s account are instantiated by
a perceiver’s response to her environment.
Hutto lastly claims that instances of sensorimotor coupling do not coincide with
continuous temporal experience, and this is another reason why he suggests that knowledge be
removed entirely from their thesis, since having knowledge he argues, necessitates the idea that
having an experience can be understood as a series of discrete synchronic events,75 although he
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further elaborates that this will leave them with a weak theory.76 Instead, Hutto offers that what
O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory allows for is an empirically supported
refutation of the idea that experience is constituted by the formation of passive, internal
representations of outer scenes.77
Hutto’s claim that knowledge is not needed for conscious experience is based on the idea
that experiences cannot be accounted for on a dispositionallike schema. If one has knowledge,
Hutto claims, then it delimits the possibility of change in perception in the future, and of
continuous, or recurrent temporal experience, and thus occurrent perceptual experience.[78][ 79 ]
Hutto and Myin address this problem in Radicalizing Enactivism by proposing that we can have
perceptual consciousness without any kind of content, and call this radical enactivism.80 They
also deny the vehicle/content distinction,81 and propose that perception is constituted by patterns
of perceiveractivity as they are situated environmentally.82 Hutto and Myin’s solution to the
objections they present to a sensorimotor contingency theory is that perception is made up of
perceivers’ patterns of activity between them and the environment: nothing more and nothing
less.83
For these reasons, I argue that we can solve Hutto’s claims by looking toward an account
that answers these objections. We can take up Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s embodied
cognition theory, and enactivism in order to understand the theoretical basis of a sensorimotor
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contingency theory that can be found in embodied cognition. Embodied cognition is such that the
body and mind are brought together, where reflection is experiential, performative, and mindful.
84

I offer that understanding the embodied cognition aspect of an enactivist theory demonstrates

the value of an enactivist theory, which is especially concerned with guiding future cognitive
science research to a more unified view of phenomenology and cognition.
III. Embodied cognition
I suggest that there is more to take away from O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor
contingency theory than the metaphysics of enactivism that Hutto and Myin propose as a
solution in Radicalizing Enactivism. Specifically, I take a pragmatic stance with O’Regan and
Noë’s enactive sensorimotor contingency theory, and suggest that the ideas of embodied
cognition illuminate the theory’s value. For this reason, we should look to Varela, Thompson,
and Rosch’s definition of enactivism, and then the epistemological implications of enactivism
can be illuminated.
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch describe enactive cognitive science as a paradigm
instantiated by the mindfulness/meditation tradition.85 O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor
contingency theory is compatible with Varela et al.’s theory of how perception can occur: that is,
via a coupling of the perceiver’s sensorimotor and environmental structures.86 For Varela et al.,
cognition is embodied, which means it depends on structural couplings, or sensorimotor
couplings.87 They suggest that the implications that this has on cognitive science research is such
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that if cognition is thought of as environmentally dependent,88 and human experience, broadly, is
consequently selfless, or openended, then we can rid ourselves of absolutist views in empirical
research.89 Instead we can view experience as lived and shared, which can create liberating
transformation in the natural and social sciences.90 The epistemological implication of Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch’s embodied, or enacted cognition is that knowledge is a lived experience.
Knowledge is not preexistent, but is constructively formed, and shapes the existing world,
through historical couplings.91 Varela puts forward that “histories of structural coupling are
amenable to scientific investigation,” but have no fixed or permanent substrate,92 thus they are
“groundless,” or are constructively formed, and can be apprehended most clearly through
mindfulness perspectives towards cognitive science and phenomenal consciousness.93 For Varela
et al., this also includes a Buddhist approach to philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
One of the important epistemological implications of Varela’s embodied cognition is the
“groundlessness” of subjectivity.94 Varela supports the notion that there is a unity, or oneness
between organisms, or perceivers, and the environment.95 For Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, we
need to take into consideration, about consciousness the “middle way,” or philosophies of the
Buddhist tradition, which entails a kind of egolessness.[96][ 97] Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
present these ideas as a kind of pragmatic ethical approach to cognitive science that often is not
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approached in these terms.98 Instead, theories of mental representation assume a sort of divide
between the phenomenal and the cognitive aspects of the mental. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
in The Embodied Mind urge the enlargement of horizons of sciences about the mind.99 They
argue that the ideas from mindfulness traditions can illuminate new ideas about the presupposed
divide between phenomenal and cognitive experience.100
To me, it seems that we have an old way of understanding the ontology of the
relationship between the mind and body, expressed in a new way, given Varela, Thompson, and
Rosch’s account. The theoretical context of a sensorimotor contingency theory within an
embodied and enactivist account of conscious experience, I suggest, is pragmatically valuable for
research endeavors. In comparison to Hutto’s metaphysical thesis about basic minds without
content, I argue the pragmatic theory of embodied cognition offered by Varela Thompson and
Rosch highlights the purposes of a sensorimotor contingency theory. I argue that the embodied
cognition offered by Varela Thompson and Rosch is a way of understanding theories that fall in
within the scope of enactivism that provides ideas for new research avenues, and this is valuable.
I suggest that the benefits of an enactive or embodied theory of perception stem mostly from the
idea that it suggests further research directions for perception. From what I can tell, we find that
in Varela et al.’s embodied and enactive cognition theories regarding mindfulness/meditation and
Buddhist traditions.
I argue this is the best way to address the conceptual problems that Hutto brings up for
O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory. By looking to Varela, Thompson, and
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Rosch’s work on enactive cognition, there is opportunity to guide scientific research.101 The
notions of embodiment are foundational to the motivation behind an enactivist sensorimotor
contingency theory, and have pragmatic value that can be best illuminated by Varela, Thompson,
and Rosch’s original ideas about experience and embodiment.
Conclusion. I presented O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory, and then I
offered two critical objections to a sensorimotor contingency theory one concerning the
phenomenon of synaesthesia, and the other concerning the problem of perceiverbased
knowledge for perceptual experience. These objections, I hold, are shown here to have less
argumentative force when analyzed comparatively in the broader framework of the history of
enactivism and contextualized in the surrounding ideas about the embodied nature of cognition.
The phenomenon of synaesthesia was shown compatible with sensorimotor coupling
because of the temporally extended nature of both the content and vehicles of perception in
sensorimotor coupling. The problems that Hutto presented for the sensorimotor contingency
theory were that the theory falls back onto a representational paradigm about the mental because
of the skills or knowledge one uses to physiologically enact sensorimotor laws. I then argued that
context of enactivism, which has its foundations in Varela et al.’s embodied cognition and
mindfulness traditions, needs to be addressed in order to understand the value and uses of a
sensorimotor approach in further research. Conceptually and contextually framing a sensory
motor contingency theory theories in embodiedcognition base emphasizes the theory’s value for
future scientific research and cognitive science research regarding both the nature of the mind
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and perceptual consciousness. This is arguably the most productive way of understanding an
enactive sensorimotor contingency theory.
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